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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
______________ 
 
No: 14-1187 
______________ 
 
 
BARRY R. TANGERT, JR., 
     Appellant 
 
v. 
 
MARK CROSSAN; SCOTT MILLER; WILLIAM FRALEY; 
GILBERT MORRISSEY; M.L. HENRY, Captain; JAMIE KEATING;  
NICK CHIMIENTI; KATHY JO WINTERBOTTOM 
 
On appeal from United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
District Court No. 1:11-cv-02395 
District Judge:  The Honorable William W. Caldwell 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
January 21, 2015 
 
Before:  RENDELL, SMITH, and KRAUSE, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: January 30, 2015) 
 
___________________________ 
 
OPINION 
____________________________ 
 
SMITH, Circuit Judge. 
                                              
 This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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 Barry R. Tangert, Jr., a former Pennsylvania State Police (PSP) Trooper, was 
terminated from his employment in May of 2011 following his conviction for obstructing 
the administration of law, 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5101.  In December of 2011, Tangert 
initiated this civil action against Cumberland County Assistant District Attorney Jamie 
Keating and seven PSP employees of various ranks and positions.  Tangert asserted two 
causes of action.  First, he claimed that all of the defendants had violated his First 
Amendment rights by “conjur[ing] up a plan to prosecute [him] in a selective and 
vindictive fashion in retaliation” for speaking out on a matter of public concern.  Second, 
he claimed that Kathy Jo Winterbottom, a PSP employee involved in the internal 
investigation of Tangert’s conduct, violated his Fourth Amendment rights by unlawfully 
arresting him “for absolutely no just or proper reason merely to embarass and humiliate 
him.” 
 After the close of discovery, Keating and the PSP defendants filed motions for 
summary judgment.  In a thorough opinion, the District Court granted both motions.  This 
timely appeal followed.1   
 Tangert challenges only the grant of summary judgment on his First Amendment 
retaliatory prosecution claim.  He contends that the District Court did not apply the 
proper summary judgment standard because it failed to view the facts in the light most 
                                              
1 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343.  Appellate 
jurisdiction exists under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Our review of an order granting summary 
judgment is plenary.  Zimmerman v. Norfolk S. Corp., 706 F.3d 170, 195 (3d Cir. 2013).  
Summary judgment is proper when the “movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as 
to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 56(a). 
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favorable to him as the nonmoving party.  See Plumhoff v. Rickard, 134 S. Ct. 2012, 2017 
(2014) (observing that review of the denial of summary judgment requires that “we view 
the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party”). He also asserts that the 
District Court erred because there are genuine issues of fact with regard to his retaliatory 
prosecution claim. 
 Tangert’s arguments lack merit.  Regardless of how the evidence was viewed, 
there is no dispute in this case that Tangert was convicted by a jury of violating 18 Pa. 
Cons. Stat. § 5101 by obstructing the administration of law.  That conviction has not been 
set aside.  Because “[a] criminal conviction requires proof of guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt, a much higher standard than that required for a finding of probable cause,” 
Marcavage v. Nat’l Park Serv., 666 F.3d 856, 859 (3d Cir. 2012), there can be no dispute 
that there was probable cause to support that charge against Tangert.  This is fatal to his 
retaliatory prosecution claim because the Supreme Court has held that such a cause of 
action requires proof that probable cause was lacking.  Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 
252, 266-67 (2006).  Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
 
  
 
